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Abstract 
 
On 23 June 2016 the British people voted by 52% to 48% to leave the European Union, dividing 
the country. While the way forward is still unclear, this contribution lays out the legal framework 
surrounding the referendum and analyses appeals to the people in the immediate aftermath of 
the outcome. The article discusses the UK’s less-than-clear-cut ‘constitutional requirements’ for 
the purposes of activating the withdrawal process under Article 50 of the Treaty on European 
Union and the extent of executive or parliamentary approval needed. An original content analysis 
of the first speeches of political leaders as the referendum result became clear reveals intriguing 
contradictions, lending weight to the view that this was a Pyrrhic victory for the leaders of the 
Leave campaign who wanted to ‘Take Back Control’. Paradoxically, the ensuing loss of power in 
leaving the EU may turn out to be entirely at odds with what voters intended. Given the false 
and misleading claims made during the demagogic campaign, the article also outlines some 
proposals for the conduct of future referenda. 
 
 
CONTENTS: 1. Introduction; 2. The immediate aftermath of the referendum; 3. The legal framework; 4. 
Conclusions, prospects and proposals 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
On 23 June 2016 the British people voted by 52% to 48% to leave the European Union, dividing 
the country. The new Prime Minister Theresa May, herself a very quiet Remain supporter, has 
categorically and repeatedly stated that “Brexit means Brexit”. At the time of writing it is still 
unclear what sort of Brexit, and the process under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union 
which triggers a Member State’s withdrawal from the European Union has yet to be invoked 
(although May very recently indicated that this will happen by the end of March 2017). 
Nevertheless, the message is that the people have spoken “and their will must be respected”.1  
 
This contribution focuses upon appeals to the people in the aftermath of the referendum result, 
in two senses. The first sense is embodied in the idea of argumentum ad populum, and is strongly 
linked to the demagogic nature of the Leave campaign. Argumentum ad populum denotes a 
fallacious argument that concludes that a proposition is true because many or most people 
believe it. Significantly, the population’s expertise, experience or authority is not taken into 
consideration. The proposition that the British people could ‘Take Back Control’, the mantra of 
the Leave campaign, is a prime example of just such a fallacious argument. The campaign also 
played upon the idea of the underdog versus the establishment elite and experts. 
 
The second sense is a more general appeal to the public, for example a plea for support or for 
unity. In amongst the quite striking number of politicians deserting or stepping down following 
                                                          
1 EU Referendum Outcome, Prime Minister’s statement, 24 June 2016 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-referendum-outcome-pm-statement-24-june-2016 
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the result, and the immediate reneging on ‘promises’ made during the Leave campaign, such as 
National Health Service funding and control over immigration, these different appeals can be 
seen in speeches of political leaders immediately after the referendum result. 
 
This contribution will first consider the immediate aftermath of the vote. I carry out a content 
analysis of the first speeches of relevant political leaders immediately after the result on 24 June 
2016.  Although this is a crude method, it reveals some intriguing insights and contradictions. 
The second part will consider the legal framework surrounding the referendum and, more 
importantly, the ‘constitutional requirements’ of the UK for the purposes of invoking Article 50 
of the Treaty on European Union. Given the UK’s lack of a written constitution, defining these 
requirements is not a straightforward matter. The relevant legislation is the European 
Communities Act 1972, the European Union Act 2011, and the EU Referendum Act 2015. 
These Acts will be considered in addition to the Conservative Party Manifesto 2015, given that it 
was Prime Minister David Cameron’s decision to call a referendum on EU membership in an 
attempt to placate factions within his own party. This gives rise to consideration of the debate 
surrounding the role of Parliament in the decision to leave the EU and the conflict between 
representative democracy and direct democracy as embodied in the referendum and petitions 
following its outcome. The article concludes with prospects at the time of writing and proposals 
for the conduct of future referenda. 
 
 
2. The immediate aftermath of the referendum 
 
As the UK awoke on 24 June, the truth dawned that by a slim majority the electorate had voted 
to leave the EU. In terms of participation, the turnout for the EU referendum was 72.2% of the 
UK population.2 This was relatively high, for example compared with 66.1% turnout for the 
2015 General Election and 35.6% for the last European Parliament election in 2014. The 
question put to the population was: ‘Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the 
European Union or leave the European Union?’. 17.4 million voters, or 51.9%, voted Leave, and 
16.1 million, representing 48.1%, voted Remain. According to polling, Leave voters were on the 
whole characterised as poorer, less well educated, and older. 
 
This was not the expected result. Having gambled and lost, Prime Minister David Cameron 
announced his pending resignation, leaving it to the winners to sort out the chaos.3 Immediately, 
prominent Leave members reneged4 on the promises which were the foundation of their 
campaign. The appeals to the people during the campaign included the strong insinuation that 
the UK’s supposed £350 million a week contribution to the EU (an amount discredited, but 
repeatedly parroted anyway) would be spent on the National Health Service - by individuals on 
record as wanting to privatise the NHS. The message on the side of the campaign bus had read 
“We send the EU £350 million a week. Let’s fund our NHS instead”. The other significant claim 
was that the UK could take back control of its borders by reducing EU immigration - despite it 
not being part of the Schengen Area in the first place. Over breakfast, Nigel Farage, leader of the 
                                                          
2 http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referenda/past-elections-
and-referenda/eu-referendum/electorate-and-count-information  
3 “I will do everything I can as Prime Minister to steady the ship over the coming weeks and months, but I do 
not think it would be right for me to try to be the captain that steers our country to its next destination.” EU 
Referendum Outcome, Prime Minister’s statement, 24 June 2016 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-
referendum-outcome-pm-statement-24-june-2016  
4 Or ‘backpedalled’: an appropriate term for the former Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, who introduced the 
London bikes scheme… 
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UK Independence Party, announced that the NHS message had been a “mistake”.5  That 
evening, Daniel Hannan, a Conservative Leave campaigner, asserted that there would not be a 
radical decline in immigration by leaving the EU. 6  
 
The atmosphere at the victory press conference7 given by Michael Gove and Boris Johnson was 
funereal. It quickly became painfully clear that there was no plan for what should happen in the 
event of a Leave vote (except from the pro-Remain First Minister of Scotland Nicola Sturgeon 
who seized the opportunity to reopen the question of Scottish independence). Having been so 
keen to ‘take back control’, Johnson stalled for time, emphasising that there was no need to set 
in motion the process for leaving the EU: “it is vital to stress there is no need for haste…There 
is no need to invoke Article 50.” There were a striking number of desertions in the face of this 
victory. Six days later, unable to count on the support of his Leave compatriot Gove, Johnson 
withdrew his candidature from the Conservative leadership contest.8 Nigel Farage, having at least 
partially achieved his goal, resigned (for the second time) as UK Independence Party leader on 4 
July – but remains as a Member of the European Parliament with the benefits that entails.  
 
The subtle and not-so-subtle language used in appealing to the people during the campaign and 
following the result is clearly important. Even the Remain campaign took on the terminology of 
the Leave camp to try to get its message across, stymied by years of myths and erroneous 
coverage in the tabloid press. For example, referring to trade ‘with’ Europe rather than ‘within’ it 
– subtly reinforcing a separation between the UK and the rest of the continent, and a ‘them and 
us’ outlook. 
 
Continuing the linguistic theme, this section reports on an original content analysis of the first 
speeches of relevant political leaders immediately after the result. This analysis includes the 
speeches on 24 June 2016 of (outgoing) Prime Minister David Cameron,9 leading Leave 
campaigners and Ministers Boris Johnson10 and Michael Gove,11 UK Independence Party leader 
Nigel Farage,12 First Minister of Scotland Nicola Sturgeon,13 and Opposition Leader Jeremy 
Corbyn.14 I also consider Theresa May’s brief speech on 11 July 2016 when it became clear she 
would be the Brexit Prime Minister.15 This is a crude analysis, particularly as the speeches are 
different lengths and sometimes include other purposes such as appealing to internal party 
                                                          
5 ITV Good Morning Britain, 24 June 2016; see also ‘Nigel Farage: £350 million pledge to fund the NHS was 'a 
mistake'’ The Telegraph, 24 June 2016 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/24/nigel-farage-350-million-
pledge-to-fund-the-nhs-was-a-mistake/ and ‘Nigel Farage backtracks on Leave campaign's '£350m for the NHS' 
pledge hours after result’ The Independent 24 June 2016 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-
referendum-result-nigel-farage-nhs-pledge-disowns-350-million-pounds-a7099906.html  
6 BBC Newsnight, 24 June 2016. See also The Independent ‘Free movement of labour might not end after 
Brexit, admits Tory Leave campaigner Daniel Hannan’ 25 June 2016 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/eu-referendum-tory-campaigner-admits-brexit-immigration-
some-control-a7102626.html  
7 http://europe.newsweek.com/boris-johnsons-brexit-victory-speech-full-transcript-474086 
8 ‘Boris Johnson dramatically rules himself out of Conservative election race’ The Telegraph, 30 June 2016 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/30/boris-johnson-dramtically-rules-himself-out-of-conservative-elec/  
9 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-referendum-outcome-pm-statement-24-june-2016  
10 http://europe.newsweek.com/boris-johnsons-brexit-victory-speech-full-transcript-474086  
11 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-referendum-nigel-farage-4am-victory-speech-the-text-in-
full-a7099156.html  
12 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-referendum-nigel-farage-4am-victory-speech-the-text-in-
full-a7099156.html  
13 http://stv.tv/news/politics/1358534-nicola-sturgeon-speech-in-full-after-eu-referendum-result/  
14 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ou9xTG5_g2M  
15 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/11/theresa-may-launches-conservative-leadership-bid-as-andrea-
leads/  
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politics – for example, Jeremy Corbyn spoke for 18 minutes, whereas the other speeches are 
between around 2 and 10 minutes long. However, it gives some intriguing insights and reveals 
considerable contradictions between campaign strategy and views expressed after the result. The 
table shows the incidences of the words I initially searched for in all speeches – ‘people’, 
‘citizens’, ‘democra*’ (the root of ‘democracy’ or ‘democratic’ etc), ‘control’ (given the 
importance of this word in the campaign) as well as other concepts which recurred in particular 
speeches such as ‘independence’, ‘country’, ‘nation’ and ‘community’. Obviously, the weight 
given to these words depends on their context. 
 
Considering the key message that a vote to leave the EU would mean the British people ‘taking 
back control’, we might expect to see that phrase repeated in the victory speeches. Boris Johnson 
did mention ‘control’ 3 times, and ‘democracy’ a similar number. Nigel Farage did not refer to 
‘control’ but used ‘independence’ (as in “Independence Day”) twice, unsurprisingly given that he 
was the leader of the UK Independence Party. Michael Gove’s speech was the most intriguing. 
There was no mention at all of ‘control’, but conversely 6 mentions of ‘openness’: “We have 
always been an open, inclusive, tolerant, creative and generous nation – open for business, open 
to trade, open to other cultures, open to the world. Now, we have a new chance to extend that 
openness even further.” He also invoked our “European friends” and “friendly cooperation”. 
On the other side, Theresa May, Remain supporter and incoming Prime Minister, did however 
raise the idea of control, attempting to link it to unity: "…we are going to give people more 
control over their lives and that's how together we will build a better Britain." 
 
‘Taking back control’ also appeared to mean being less interested in the advice of experts. 
During a question & answer debate on Sky News on 2 June 2016, Gove famously said “People 
in this country have had enough of experts” when he was unable to point to any economic 
evidence supporting his position. His victory speech showed a change of heart: “We should draw 
on the wisdom of great minds outside of politics”.  
 
Boris Johnson stated that he was looking forward to “continuing to interact with the peoples of 
other countries in a way that is open and friendly and outward-looking.” Interestingly, these 
words exactly echo the view of Nicola Sturgeon, an enthusiastic Remain supporter. In her speech 
she twice stated that “…we [Scotland] voted to renew our reputation as an outward looking, 
open and inclusive country.” That Johnson’s view after the result seems out of step with his 
attitude during the campaign itself is not surprising given that he apparently drafted two 
positions, one for Remain and one for Leave, before deciding that being a leading voice in the 
Leave campaign would best serve his personal ambition of becoming Prime Minister. 
 
There were mixed messages in a number of speeches. Outside 10 Downing Street, David 
Cameron said that “I was absolutely clear about my belief that Britain is stronger, safer and 
better off inside the European Union…” However, “I have said before that Britain can survive 
outside the European Union, and indeed that we could find a way.” This ambivalence is also 
apparent in the Conservative Party Manifesto for the 2015 General Election, discussed in the 
next section. For his part, Boris Johnson appeared to acknowledge that it is actually Parliament’s 
role to take this kind of decision: “Today I think all of us politicians need to thank the British 
people for the way they have been doing our job for us. They hire us to deal with the hard 
questions and this year we gave them one of the biggest and toughest questions of all.” 
However, in the next breath he said “Some people are now saying that was wrong and that 
people should never have been asked in that way. I disagree, it was entirely right and inevitable 
and there is no way of dealing with a decision on this scale except by putting it to the people.” 
He finished by saying “The most precious thing this country has given the world is the idea of 
parliamentary democracy. I believe the British people have spoken up for democracy…”, which 
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does seem to sidestep the distinction between parliamentary and direct democracy as expressed 
through a referendum. 
 
The speakers invoked ‘people’ in different ways. Most evidently, reference to ‘the people’ was 
made in the sense of demos or the populace of the United Kingdom. David Cameron used the 
phrase ‘the British people’ 5 times, colloquial ‘Brits’ once, ‘the people’ twice, ‘our people’ once, 
and ‘people’ from elsewhere 3 times. Boris Johnson referred to the ‘British people’ twice, ‘the 
people’ in the sense of populace 4 times, and ‘the peoples of other countries’ once. Johnson also 
made reference to the people who govern once, and the people to whom they are accountable 
once. It is notable that Cameron and Sturgeon both used ‘people’ to refer to the domestic 
electorate and ‘citizens’ to refer to EU citizens in the UK (Sturgeon: from other EU countries; 
and Cameron ‘European’ citizens, and ‘Brits’ in ‘European’ countries). As national leaders, they 
adopt the more precise EU terminology. No other speakers refer to ‘citizens’. 
 
We might expect the leader of a nationalist party to pay homage to the ‘British people’. Farage’s 
4.00 a.m. speech did not do so. Instead he announced “a victory for real people, a victory for 
ordinary people, a victory for decent people”, which implied that Remain voters had none of 
those attributes. Interestingly, he also claimed to be acting on behalf of the “rest of Europe”. In 
his brief speech, Farage was the only speaker not to mention democracy, which all other 
speakers referred to more than once. 
 
Appeals for unity were present in speeches from both sides. From the Remain side, David 
Cameron said “The British people have made a choice. That not only needs to be respected — 
but those on the losing side of the argument, myself included, should help to make it work.” 
Jeremy Corbyn also emphasised the importance of “bringing people together”, especially 
referring to the economic inequality that played a large role in the Leave vote. He was also the 
speaker, surprisingly together with Michael Gove, who placed most importance on 
‘communities’. Conservative Theresa May, with a seemingly rather socialist vision, urged that 
“We need to unite our country and ... we need a strong, new positive vision for the future of our 
country - a vision of a country that works not for the privileged few, but that works for every 
one of us.” Among the Leavers, Johnson appealed twice to ‘young people’ in particular, who on 
the whole did not vote for the outcome he supported. Gove was particularly keen that people 
from all communities and political backgrounds work together, and suggested that “calmly and 
united, [we can] take our country forward in the spirit of the warm, humane and generous values 
that are the best of Britain”. 
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Table: content analysis of first speeches on 24 June 2016 
 
Speaker (with 
length of 
speech) 
Incidence of words found in speech 
(top 3 concepts for each speaker in bold) 
‘People’ ‘Citizens’ ‘Control’  ‘Democra*’ Other 
Cameron 
(7:09) 
14 1 (of other 
European 
countries) 
0 4 Country 7 
National interest 2 
Brits 1 
Johnson 
(1:48) 
14 0 3  3 Country 9 
 
Gove 
(3:20) 
3 0 0  3 Open 6 
Friend* 2 
Nation 2 
Country 2 (but 1 in tribute 
to Cameron) 
Community 1 
Farage 
(2:25) 
5 (2 
incidences 
referring to 
campaign 
people) 
0 0  0 Independen* 2 
Nation 2 
Friend 1 
Sturgeon 
(10:11) 
5 1 (of other 
EU 
countries in 
Scotland) 
0 2 Independence (of 
Scotland) 5 
Community/ies 3 
Country 3 
Freedom (of movement) 1 
Corbyn  
(18:00) 
15 0 1 (of 
exploitation 
of workers) 
2 Communities 8 
Protections (working 
rights, human rights, 
environment) 3 
Country 2  
Cohesion 1 
Divided/divisive  
Freedom (to shape 
economy) 1 
 
 
 
3. The legal framework 
 
Having established reactions in the immediate aftermath of the referendum result, what happens 
now? As is now well known, Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, introduced by the 
Lisbon Treaty, provides for a Member State to withdraw from the EU and establishes the 
procedure it must follow. At this stage two points are particularly important to note. First, 
according to Article 50(2) TEU “A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the 
European Council of its intention.” That is, the onus is on the withdrawing Member State to 
make the notification, and therefore the timing of that notification is within the control of that 
Member State. The other Member States and the EU institutions have no competence, at least 
from a legal perspective, to push the withdrawing Member State - of course, political pressure 
may be a different matter. Another element of this is the meaning of ‘Member State’. Practically 
speaking, who should be involved in making the notification? This leads to the second point: 
Article 50(1) states that “Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in 
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accordance with its own constitutional requirements.” It is therefore imperative to establish the 
UK’s ‘constitutional requirements’.  
There has been no rush to invoke Article 50 following the referendum. Instead the government 
is playing for time while scrambling to establish a negotiating position since a Member State will 
automatically cease to be a member of the EU two years after notifying its intention to leave 
unless that deadline is unanimously extended (Article 50(3) TEU). However, Prime Minister 
Theresa May has recently indicated that the Article 50 notification will happen before the end of 
March 2017. 
The rest of this section considers the UK’s constitutional requirements. First, it examines the 
Conservative Party Manifesto 2015 as the political basis for the referendum. It then considers the 
European Union Referendum Act 2015 which gave effect to the manifesto commitment for a 
referendum. Following that, we consider the European Union Act 2011, which provides for the 
‘double lock’ of a referendum as well as parliamentary approval in a wide range of situations, 
together with the European Communities Act 1972, the ‘constitutional statute’ which enacts the 
UK’s accession to the EU and the effect of EU law. It then discusses parliamentary sovereignty 
and the debate over the need for parliamentary involvement following the June referendum 
which goes to the question of who represents the Member State and on what authority they can 
make the Article 50 notification to the European Council. 
Eurosceptic Members of Parliament in the Conservative party unsuccessfully tried to push 
through a proposal for an in-out referendum on EU membership following a House of 
Commons debate in October 2011.16 Under the Labour government of Tony Blair, referenda 
had been mooted, but did not ultimately take place, on joining the euro currency and on the pre-
Lisbon Constitutional Treaty 2004. The Lisbon Treaty was ratified in the UK solely by 
legislation, with no referendum. In November 2009, David Cameron as leader of the 
Conservative Party committed, if the Party was elected, to a United Kingdom Sovereignty Bill, 
repatriation of some powers from the EU to the UK, and a referendum lock on future transfer 
of powers to the EU: "Never again should it be possible for a British government to transfer 
power to the EU without the say of the British people".17  In due course the Conservative Party, 
together with the pro-EU Liberal Democrats as coalition partners, came back to power following 
the General Election 2010. Cameron’s speech informed the Conservative Party’s manifesto, and 
subsequently the Bill which became the European Union Act 2011. 
 
Consequently, an ‘in or out’ referendum on the UK’s EU membership was one of the pledges in 
the Conservative Party’s Manifesto for the 2015 General Election.18 The relationship with the 
EU appeared under two topics: ‘Controlled immigration that benefits Britain’ and ‘Keeping our 
country secure’: 
                                                          
16 The motion was ‘That this House calls upon the Government to introduce a Bill in the next session of 
Parliament to provide for the holding of a national referendum on whether the United Kingdom should (a) 
remain a member of the European Union on the current terms; (b) leave the European Union; or (c) re-negotiate 
the terms of its membership in order to create a new relationship based on trade and co-operation.’ The motion 
calling for a referendum was defeated by 482 to 111 votes. https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2011-10-
24/debates/1110247000001/NationalReferendumOnTheEuropeanUnion 
17 David Cameron ‘A Europe policy that people can believe in’ 4 November 2009 
http://conservativehome.blogs.com/files/david-cameron-europe-statement.pdf; see also 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/nov/04/david-cameron-ditches-eu-referendum; 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/6502361/EU-Lisbon-Treaty-David-Cameron-promises-
vote-on-future-EU-changes.html  
18 ‘The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015’ https://s3-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/manifesto2015/ConservativeManifesto2015.pdf 
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In the ‘Keeping our country secure’ section, on ‘real change in our relationship with the 
European Union’, the Manifesto tends not to focus on the benefits of EU membership. Rather, 
it states: “For too long, your voice has been ignored on Europe. We will: give you a say over whether we 
should stay in or leave the EU, with an in-out referendum by the end of 2017; commit to 
keeping the pound and staying out of the Eurozone; reform the workings of the EU, which is too 
big, too bossy and too bureaucratic; reclaim power from Brussels on your behalf and safeguard British 
interests in the Single Market; back businesses to create jobs in Britain by completing ambitious 
trade deals and reducing red tape.”19  This type of emotive and scapegoating language obviously 
does not help to make the case for remaining in the EU, despite Cameron’s position for Remain. 
This is an indication of what Jean Claude Juncker, European Commission President, meant 
when he told the German newspaper Bild on 25 June 2016: “If someone complains about 
Europe from Monday to Saturday then nobody is going to believe him on Sunday when he says 
he is a convinced European”. 
 
Under the heading ‘Controlled immigration that benefits Britain’, the Manifesto states “Our plan 
to control immigration will put you, your family and the British people first” including 
“control[ling] migration from the European Union, by reforming welfare rules”.20 Furthermore, 
“We will negotiate new rules with the EU, so that people will have to be earning here for a 
number of years before they can claim benefits, including the tax credits that top up low wages. 
Instead of something-for-nothing, we will build a system based on the principle of something-
for-something.”21 These statements immediately brand workers and citizens from other EU 
Member States as ‘welfare benefit tourists’. The Manifesto also emphasises several times that the 
UK is creating more jobs than the rest of the EU put together.22 It makes clear that any changes 
to welfare benefits will be put to the people in a straight in-out referendum.  “After the election, 
we will negotiate a new settlement for Britain in Europe, and then ask the British people whether 
they want to stay in the EU on this reformed basis or leave.”23 In fact it was not these changes that 
were put to the British people. There was no causal link in the referendum campaign between 
the deal reached by Cameron and the ‘in or out’ membership question. The changes negotiated 
were not prominent in the Remain campaign. 
 
Whereas the Conservative Manifesto and the party’s success in the 2015 General Election 
provides the political basis for the referendum, the EU Referendum Act 2015, which came into 
force in December 2015, lays down the legal basis for this particular referendum, such as the 
question to be asked, the timing of the campaigning period, and the use of campaign funds. 
According to section 6(1) of the 2015 Act, “The Secretary of State must publish a report which 
contains…(a) a statement setting out what has been agreed by member States following 
negotiations relating to the United Kingdom’s request for reforms to address concerns over its 
membership of the European Union, and (b) the opinion of the Government of the United 
Kingdom on what has been agreed.” This outlines the fact that a ‘deal’ as promised in the 
Manifesto above should be secured and then communicated to the public. Furthermore, it 
implies that the referendum should be decided on the basis of that deal. If that were the case, a 
more apt referendum question would have been whether the public did or did not support the 
outcome of the deal secured in February 2016. 
 
                                                          
19 Conservative Manifesto, p. 72 
20 Conservative Manifesto, p. 29 
21 Conservative Manifesto, p. 29-30 
22 Conservative Manifesto, p. 7, p. 17 
23 Conservative Manifesto, p. 72-73 
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The elements of that deal at the European Council in February 201624 were:  
- an opt out from the concept of ‘ever closer union’, clarifying that the UK had no commitment 
to further political integration 
- changes to welfare benefits. This had two parts: (a) limiting access to in-work benefits for 4 
years from when a person started work in the host State, graduated to acknowledge the 
increasing connection of the worker with the labour market of the host state. This emergency 
brake on benefits could only operate for a total period of 7 years; (b) concerning exportation of 
child benefit, that benefit would be indexed to the conditions of the Member State where the 
child was resident 
- the UK would not have to contribute to Eurozone bailouts 
- a commitment to enhancing competitiveness and lowering administrative burdens 
 
As was made clear at the European Council, this agreement would become void in the event of a 
decision to leave the EU, and the UK is therefore now back to square one in terms of 
negotiating its future relationship.  
 
While the EU Referendum Act 2015 applied only to the June 2016 referendum, the domestic 
legislation governing the UK’s membership of the EU is the European Communities Act 1972 
preceding the UK’s accession in 1973, and the more recent European Union Act 2011. Section 2 
of the 1972 Act provides that all rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions created or 
arising by or under the EU Treaties are part of UK law. In the seminal Factortame case, Lord 
Bridge ruled that “whatever limitation of its sovereignty Parliament accepted when it enacted the 
European Communities Act 1972 was entirely voluntary.”25  This case law emphasises the domestic 
basis of the supremacy of EU law. This reasoning is significant as the doctrine of Parliamentary 
sovereignty is a foundation of the UK’s unwritten constitution. According to Dicey’s classic 
conceptualisation, Parliament has the power “to make or unmake any law whatsoever”, so that 
each Parliament cannot bind its successors.26 As a result, the tenet of implied repeal means that 
any Act of Parliament can simply be repealed by a subsequent Act of Parliament on the same 
subject matter. Following the classic view, there is no hierarchy of statutes. However, in a newer 
understanding of sovereignty, there are some limitations on this – for example, the concept of 
the ‘constitutional statute’; and mechanisms within legislation that can make repeal more difficult 
such as requirements for referenda, specifying that future legislation must be created through a 
particular ‘manner and form’.27 In the context of the EC Act 1972, Lord Justice Laws in Thoburn 
v Sunderland City Council, asserted that the Act was a ‘constitutional statute’,28 meaning that it was 
not subject to implied repeal but could only be expressly repealed by Parliament.  
 
Echoing Dicey’s orthodoxy, the Ministerial statement announcing the Bill which became the 
European Union Act 2011 expressed an intention to underline that “what a sovereign Parliament 
can do, a sovereign Parliament can always undo”.29 Paradoxically, this only serves to underline 
                                                          
24 European Council meeting (18 and 19 February 2016) – Conclusions, EUCO 1/16 http://docs.dpaq.de/10395-
0216-euco-conclusions.pdf  
25 R v Secretary of State for Transport  ex parte Factortame (No. 2) [1991] 1 AC 603 at 659 
26 A V DICEY Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th edition, 1915, Macmillan), pp. 37-38 
27 W I JENNINGS The Law and the Constitution (5th edition, 1959, University of London Press). For further 
discussion in relation to the EU Act 2011 see M GORDON & M DOUGAN ‘The UK’s EU Act 2011: “Who 
Won the Bloody War Anyway?” (2012) 37(1) E L Rev 3-30, pp. 23-24 
28 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin), the ‘Metric Martyrs’ case paragraphs 62-69 
29 Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Rt Hon Lord Howell of Guildford ‘EU Bill to include 
Parliamentary sovereignty clause’, 6 October 2010 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/eu-bill-to-include-
parliamentary-sovereignty-clause  
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the redundancy of the so-called sovereignty clause in the 2011 Act. 30 This clause received the 
most attention as the Bill was going through Parliament. Section 18 provides that:  “Directly 
applicable or directly effective EU law (that is, the rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, 
restrictions, remedies and procedures referred to in section 2(1) of the European Communities 
Act 1972) falls to be recognised and available in law in the United Kingdom only by virtue of 
that Act or where it is required to be recognised and available in law by virtue of any other Act.” 
Section 18 in fact stops shorts of mentioning sovereignty, and instead affirms that the status of 
EU law is dependent on a continuing UK statutory basis. In that sense there is nothing novel in 
this provision and it is merely declaratory. 
 
The other significant feature of the 2011 Act is the system of ‘referendum locks’, which aligns 
more closely with the ‘manner and form’ view of UK parliamentary sovereignty.  The 
referendum lock means that any future EU Treaty transferring powers from the UK to the EU 
must be put to a referendum (sections 2, 3 and 6). A number of changes require both a 
referendum and parliamentary approval. Other changes or decisions require only an Act of 
Parliament (section 7) or other lesser parliamentary approval (section 10). There are a number of 
detailed provisions defining the triggers for referenda, and the range of situations covered is 
extremely broad.  
 
Section 2(2) of the EU Act 2011 requires that an Act of Parliament approving a Treaty 
amendment cannot come into force until there has been a positive majority vote in a national 
referendum. Section 2 covers Treaty amendment by the ordinary revision procedure detailed in 
Article 48(2)-(5) TEU. This also applies to any EU decision using the passerelle clause in Article 
48(7) TEU, which would involve a shift from unanimity to qualified majority voting, or from the 
special to the ordinary legislative procedure. Section 3 of the EU Act relates to changes made 
using the simplified revision procedure under Article 48(6) TEU, and section 4 lists the areas 
where a referendum would be required. 
 
A new Treaty, or a Treaty change, which does not transfer power from the UK to the EU would 
not require a referendum, according to the exemption in section 4. However, it is arguable that 
there will be grey areas surrounding the extension of competence, a new competence, or 
codification of an existing competence. In the case of changes made using the simplified revision 
procedure only, there is a further potential escape from the need for a referendum in the case of 
specific transfers of power or competence that are not significant to the UK (section 3(4)). 
 
Section 6 of the Act sets outs trigger events – that is, decisions requiring approval by both Act 
and by referendum. Section 6(5) states that a statute or referendum approval is needed in other 
EU decisions which are not passerelle provisions. Examples include the UK joining the euro, 
extension of the powers of the EU Public Prosecutor’s Office, removal of UK border controls 
by amendment to the Schengen protocols, and 42(2) TEU decisions in relation to common EU 
defence. This also includes extension of qualified majority voting – that is, if there is a threat to 
the UK’s veto in a given policy area. Schedule 1 lists the Treaty provisions where an amendment 
removing the need for unanimity, consensus or common accord would attract a referendum. 
 
The range of situations which should be subject to a referendum laid down in the EU Act 2011 
is clearly very wide, and features nuanced issues upon which the electorate is unlikely to be able 
to form a considered opinion. Despite all this detail, a referendum based simply on the 
fundamental question of membership of the EU is not among them. The EU Act 2011 only 
                                                          
30 For a fuller discussion of the provisions and effect of the EU Act 2011 see P CRAIG ‘The EU Act 2011: 
Locks, Limits & Legality’ 48(6) Common Market Law Review 1915-1944; M GORDON & M DOUGAN ‘The 
UK’s EU Act 2011: “Who Won the Bloody War Anyway?” (2012) 37(1) European Law Review 3-30 
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covers situations which are triggered by changes at the EU level, whereas the membership 
referendum was triggered by political forces at the domestic level.  
 
Essentially, from a legal perspective the British people were not voting in June 2016 on what the 
legislation provided for - neither Cameron’s deal from February 2016 as suggested in Art 6(1) of 
the EU Referendum Act 2015, nor a change in the EU Treaties as laid down as a reason for a 
referendum in the EU Act 2011. Instead they were voting on a blunt ‘in or out’ question from a 
political manifesto commitment. Notably, there was not even any mention of the EU Act 2011 
in the Conservative Manifesto 2015. 
 
Referenda have tended to play a rather limited role in UK public life. There were devolution 
referenda concerning Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales,31 in 2011 a referendum on 
proposed changes to the electoral system in parliamentary elections to reflect proportional 
representation,32 and the Scottish independence referendum in 2014. In terms of the UK’s 
relationship with the EU, following the EC Act 1972, the 1975 referendum on EU membership 
was an ex post consultative event.  Referenda were mooted, but did not ultimately take place, on 
joining the euro currency, and on the pre-Lisbon Constitutional Treaty 2004 which was rejected 
by the French and Dutch plebiscites. The wide range of situations in which a referendum could 
be triggered under the EU Act 2011 may suggest an increasing appetite for referenda in the UK. 
 
This does not mean that the current referendum result is binding. Legislation must be enacted by 
Parliament to give effect to the result, to repeal the EC Act 1972, to deal with existing UK 
legislation based upon EU law, and to enact whatever new relationship is negotiated. In the 
House of Commons, Members of Parliament could in theory vote according to their consciences 
rather than their constituents’ choices, and the House of Lords is likely to put up opposition. 
While some have called for a second referendum before Article 50 is invoked, and/or on the 
UK’s negotiating position with the EU, and/or on any agreement on the future relationship with 
the EU, others would prefer to steer clear of the risks of another referendum. As things stand, 
the Prime Minister Theresa May has ruled out a further referendum altogether, and continues to 
reiterate that “Brexit means Brexit”. However, there is much greater support for Parliamentary 
involvement in these decisions. The battleground for now is over how, rather than whether, the 
referendum result should be implemented, and the extent of executive over Parliamentary 
approval. This concerns the UK’s ‘own constitutional requirements’ for the purposes of Article 
50 TEU. Should the notification to the European Council by done under executive legislation, 
Prerogative, Parliamentary decision or with Parliamentary scrutiny? Theresa May has said that 
Parliament will be involved – but this does not mean that Parliament will have a veto.  
 
Many have argued that the sheer level of misinformation in the campaign meant that the 
referendum was undemocratic and the result cannot be binding.33 A significant group of 1,054 
barristers signed a letter to the Prime Minister and all Members of Parliament along similar lines: 
“There is evidence that the referendum result was influenced by misrepresentations of fact and 
promises that could not be delivered. Since the result was only narrowly in favour of Brexit, it 
cannot be discounted that the misrepresentations and promises were a decisive or contributory 
factor in the result.” This letter called for a Royal Commission or independent body to hear 
                                                          
31 Northern Ireland (Entry to Negotiations) Act 1996, Referenda (Scotland and Wales) Act 1997 [previous 
referenda also held in Scotland and Wales in 1979 
32 On the Alternative Vote system proposed by the Liberal Democrats, who had formed a coalition government 
with the Conservatives - Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011 
33 Letter to The Telegraph, 14 June 2016 signed by academics in law and political science 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2016/06/13/letters-both-remain-and-leave-are-propagating-falsehoods-at-
publ/  
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evidence and to report on the risks of invoking Article 50 – wresting back control for the experts 
who were so derided by the Leave campaign. The barristers also asserted that primary legislation 
is required to trigger Article 50 and therefore that it is for Parliament to make the final decision.34  
Scholars Barber, Hickman and King also contend that the referendum was only advisory – 
Parliament may decide that the case for exit is not made, or that it was made under false 
pretences. They argue that Parliament could also conclude that it would be contrary to the 
national interest to invoke Article 50 without knowing the terms of agreement.35 (This would 
give rise to a chicken and egg situation since it implies negotiations and an agreement before 
Article 50 is invoked.) 
 
A corollary of the referendum result and the split in the UK electorate has been the launch of a 
large number of e-petitions as an expression of direct democracy. The current system through 
the House of Commons Petitions Committee was set up in July 2015, having been initiated in 
2006 through the Prime Minister’s Office under Tony Blair. A petition with 10,000 signatures 
will receive a response from the Government, and a petition will be debated in the House of 
Commons (albeit without a vote) if it reaches 100,000 signatures. The most significant petition 
triggering a debate is the proposition that there should be a second referendum, signed by a 
considerable 4.1 million people: “We the undersigned call upon Her Majesty’s Government to 
implement a rule that if the remain or leave vote is less than 60% based a turnout less than 75% 
there should be another referendum.” As a product of the UK’s unwritten constitution, no 
thresholds for minimum turnout or margins of victory were set before the referendum itself. The 
EU Referendum Act 2015 is also entirely silent on these questions. Although the government 
has rejected a second referendum, a debate was held on 5 September 2016.36 The problem with 
this petition is that those thresholds could not be applied retrospectively. A petition to invoke 
Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty immediately also achieved over 100,000 signatures and will be 
debated on 17 October 2016. This is likely to be less significant now that Theresa May has 
indicated Article 50 will be invoked early in 2017. The Government response was “…We should 
not trigger Article 50 until we have a UK approach and objectives.”37 Petitions garnering far 
fewer signatures include one that there should be a second referendum before Art 50 TEU is 
activated, and, perhaps more realistically, one that there should be a debate in Parliament before 
Article 50 is invoked.  
 
There are also a number of judicial review applications in the courts seeking to force 
parliamentary involvement before Article 50 is activated. These applications, represented by the 
law firm Mischon de Reya, seek a declaration and an injunction to ensure that the UK 
Government will not trigger the procedure for withdrawal from the EU without an Act of 
Parliament. The case in question links several claimants, including Deir Dos Santos, a 
hairdresser, Gina Miller, an investment manager and philanthropist, and Fair Deal for Expats, a 
campaign group of Britons living in France, and there is potential for others to join. A claimant 
must first show ‘sufficient interest’ to be granted permission to bring a judicial review against 
government action under English law. The preliminary hearing was held on 19 July 2016 and the 
case has been timetabled before the High Court in October. It is likely to reach the Supreme 
                                                          
34 ‘In full: The letter from 1,000 lawyers to David Cameron over EU Referendum’, The Independent, 10 July 
2016 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/in-full-the-letter-from-1000-lawyers-to-david-cameron-
over-eu-referendum-brexit-legality-a7130226.html  
35 N BARBER, T HICKMAN & J KING, ‘Pulling the Article 50 ‘Trigger’: Parliament’s Indispensable Role’, 
UK Constitutional Law Blog, 27 June 2016 https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/27/nick-barber-tom-
hickman-and-jeff-king-pulling-the-article-50-trigger-parliaments-indispensable-role/  
36 https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/131215   
37 https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/133618  
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Court on an expedited appeal in December 2016.38 This timing would mean the judicial 
proceedings going on at the same time as the political decision to invoke Article 50. Depending 
on one’s point of view, this action can be seen as a “legal dream team… launching a last gasp 
legal bid to preserve Britain’s European Union membership”39 or “an attempt by conniving 
lawyers to thwart the will of the people”.40  
 
The Government Legal Service has advised that Article 50 can be invoked under Prerogative 
powers, and that will be their main argument in the case. Prerogative powers are customary 
executive powers held by the Crown since mediaeval times and now exercised by Ministers, 
which exist outside statute. This means, for example, that the Prime Minister alone could invoke 
Article 50 without further consultation. However, as argued by a number of constitutional law 
scholars, there is strong case law on limitation of the Prerogative.41 The De Keyser case42 
established that where statute and existing Prerogative powers overlap, Prerogative powers are 
suspended for the duration of the statutory power (such as under the EC Act 1972 or EU Act 
2011). The Fire Brigades Union case states that it would be an abuse of power to use the 
Prerogative to frustrate the will of Parliament or to pre-empt parliamentary decisions.43 Laker 
Airways means the Prerogative cannot be exercised to take away rights recognised by statute, 
including rights deriving from EU law, or to undermine the aims of a statute.44 It could be 
argued that the paradoxical loss of power through leaving the EU would be totally contrary to 
the purposes of the EU Act 2011. Using established principles of statutory interpretation, judges 
might take a purposive approach. At the very least, the EU Act 2011 represented a shift towards 
parliamentary and direct democracy away from executive power. Arvind, Kirkham and Stirton 
point out that the then Foreign Secretary, William Hague, announced that the purpose of the 
legislation was to effect “a fundamental shift in power from Ministers of the Crown to 
Parliament and the voters themselves on the most important decisions of all: who gets to decide 
what”45 on questions of European integration. Arvind at al argue that on that basis “an executive 
action which risked precisely the opposite outcome would a fortiori be unconstitutional.”46 
                                                          
38 ‘October court date for Brexit challenge’, BBC News, 19 July 2016 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-
36834743  
39 A ALDRIDGE ‘Legal dream team fights to make Brexit conditional on parliamentary backing’, 4 July 2016 
http://www.legalcheek.com/2016/07/legal-dream-team-fights-to-make-brexit-conditional-on-parliamentary-
backing/  
40 The argument reported by C O’CINNEIDE ‘Why Parliamentary Approval for the Triggering of Article 50 
TEU Should Be Required as a Matter of Constitutional Principle’, UK Constitutional Law Blog, 7 July 2016 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/07/07/colm-ocinneide-why-parliamentary-approval-for-the-triggering-of-
article-50-teu-should-be-required-as-a-matter-of-constitutional-principle/)  
41 See e.g. T T ARVIND, R M KIRKHAM & L STIRTON, ‘Article 50 and the European Union Act 2011: Why 
Parliamentary Consent is Still Necessary’ UK Constitutional Law Blog, 1 July 2016 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/07/01/t-t-arvind-richard-kirkham-and-lindsay-stirtonarticle-50-and-the-
european-union-act-2011-why-parliamentary-consent-is-still-necessary/  
42 Attorney General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] UKHL 1, [1920] AC 508 (10 May 1920) 
43 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 513. In that 
particular case, the legislation was not yet in force. 
44 Laker Airways Ltd v Department of Trade [1977] QB 643 
45 Foreign & Commonwealth Office and The Rt Hon William Hague ‘EU Bill passes Second Reading in 
Parliament’, 8 December 2010, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/eu-bill-passes-second-reading-in-
parliament  
46 T T ARVIND, R M KIRKHAM & L STIRTON, ‘Article 50 and the European Union Act 2011: Why 
Parliamentary Consent is Still Necessary’ UK Constitutional Law Blog, 1 July 2016 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/07/01/t-t-arvind-richard-kirkham-and-lindsay-stirtonarticle-50-and-the-
european-union-act-2011-why-parliamentary-consent-is-still-necessary/ . Note that other scholars believe that 
there is no need for parliament to legislate: see M ELLIOTT, Public Law blog 
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Another paradox is that UK Members of the European Parliament may have more influence 
than UK parliamentarians in the UK’s exit. Under Article 50(2) TEU, the European Parliament 
in effect has a power of veto on the final withdrawal agreement and the EU’s future relationship 
with the EU by withholding consent. Its decision will be made on an absolute majority of the 
votes cast.47 During the negotiations the European Commission is to take due account of the 
European Parliament’s views. While the European Parliament is not able to amend the 
agreement, it does have scope to engage in delay tactics, according to its own rules of procedure. 
For example, under Rule 99(4) “Where Parliament's consent is required for an envisaged 
international agreement, Parliament may decide, on the basis of a recommendation from the 
committee responsible, to suspend the consent procedure for no longer than one year”, and concerning the 
opening of negotiations under Rule 108(2) “Parliament may, on a proposal from the committee 
responsible, a political group or at least 40 Members, ask the Council not to authorise the opening of 
negotiations until Parliament has stated its position on the proposed negotiating mandate on the basis of a 
report from the committee responsible.” The Parliament could also ask the EU Court of Justice 
for its opinion on the compatibility with the Treaties of any agreement. 
 
 
4. Conclusion, prospects and proposals 
 
This contribution has considered appeals to the people in the immediate aftermath of the EU 
membership referendum. A content analysis of the first speeches of political leaders on 24 June 
2016 revealed contradictions between their views during the campaign and after the result was 
announced, lending weight to the view that this was a Pyrrhic victory for the leaders of the Leave 
campaign who wanted to ‘Take Back Control’. Paradoxically, the ensuing loss of power in 
leaving the EU may turn out to be entirely at odds with what voters intended. 
 
The analysis of the legal framework showed that the British people were not voting in June 2016 
on what the legislation provided for - neither the February 2016 European Council deal as 
suggested in Art 6(1) of the EU Referendum Act 2015, nor a change in the EU Treaties or 
powers moving from the UK to the EU laid down as reasons for a referendum in the EU Act 
2011. Instead they were voting on a blunt ‘in or out’ question from a political manifesto 
commitment. 
 
As Article 50 TEU has yet to be invoked, the article showed that the UK’s constitutional 
requirements for the purposes of withdrawing from the EU are far from straightforward, and 
there is considerable debate over the extent of necessary and desirable parliamentary scrutiny. In 
addition, the Prime Minister has announced a Great Repeal Bill, intended to repeal section 2 of 
the European Communities Act 1972 so that EU law ceases to apply immediately upon the UK’s 
exit. By pulling out the foundation of all UK legislation and regulations which are based on EU 
law, this would leave lacunae in large swathes of UK law. The most likely way of addressing this 
will be by granting power to Ministers to amend law by statutory instrument. Given the huge 
amount of legislation which needs to be unravelled, and stretched capacity in the civil service, 
prospects for effective parliamentary and other scrutiny are not promising.  
 
The story of this referendum is a cautionary tale for future governments. Leaving aside the 
strong argument that referenda are a poor way to make decisions in the first place, the false and 
misleading information repeated during the campaign undermined the democratic process, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2016/06/30/brexit-on-why-as-a-matter-of-law-triggering-article-50-does-not-
require-parliament-to-legislate/ 
47 Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, 8th parliamentary term, Rule 99 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sipade/rulesleg8/Rulesleg8.EN.pdf  
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proposals for the good conduct of future referenda should be brought forward. The UK 
Electoral Commission’s current objectives for referenda are that “they should be well-run and 
produce results that are accepted, and there should be integrity and transparency of campaign 
funding and expenditure”.48 These objectives should be strengthened and enforced, and the 
requirement for ‘integrity and transparency’ extended to the claims made during the campaign. 
The UK Electoral Commission or a similar independent body needs to check and report on the 
veracity of claims in referenda. The University College London Constitution Unit raises the 
question of enforceable rules to prevent false or misleading information, and on campaign 
conduct and use of public funds. It also suggests a review of the application of impartiality rules 
by broadcasters. There are positive models along these lines in the New Zealand Electoral 
Commission and the Irish Referendum Commissions.49  One problem is imposing an 
appropriate sanction, for example a financial penalty involving paying back public funds. A 
referendum campaign is unlike a General Election where specific political parties are identifiable; 
nevertheless it may be possible to make cross-party campaign leaders and funders responsible. In 
terms of independent fact-checking during the campaign, this must reach the public in a timely 
and accessible way.50  While such rules are important, in the context of this referendum they may 
have missed the point for those who voted Leave in order to register a protest vote against elites 
who had ignored them for too long.  
 
                                                          
48 http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referenda/past-elections-
and-referenda/eu-referendum  
49 UCL Constitution Unit ‘The UK has voted to Leave. Now we need an inquiry into referendum conduct’ 24 
June 2016 https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/constitution-unit-news/2406161. See also Report of the 
Commission on the Conduct of Referenda 1996 http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/publications/unit-publications/7.pdf 
50 There were some efforts at fact-checking during the EU referendum campaign e.g. by the BBC, Channel 4, 
UK in a Changing Europe. 
